Abstract-Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is an emerging technology that offers great promise for various applications. The sensing capabilities combined with relatively small processing power and wireless communication makes it one of the main technologies to be exploited in the future. Despite its attractive features, WSN is vulnerable to various security attacks. The constraints of WSN such as limited energy and memory make the security problem even more critical. One of the security issues of WSN is it is susceptible to sybil attack. In this attack, the adversary forges multiple entities to disrupt the entire network. This paper addresses the problem by developing a lightweight trust system using energy as a metric parameter for a hierarchical WSN. The performance evaluation of this system shows efficiency and scalability for detecting sybil attacks in terms of true and false positive detection in a heterogeneous WSN. Furthermore, this system reduces the communication overhead in the network by cancelling feedback and recommendations among sensor nodes (SNs).
INTRODUCTION (HEADING 1)
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of a large number of spatially distributed sensor nodes that can communicate with one another in a wireless manner. Typically, sensor nodes are deployed in unattended and inhospitable environments to monitor a certain phenomenon or physical measurements and transmitting the measurements are transmitted to the access point (AP) that is responsible for data fusion. The sensor nodes are used for different monitoring purposes. However, they have constraints such as limited memory, computing capability and energy [1] . Furthermore, the sensor nodes are battery powered which makes recharging or changing their batteries difficult [2] .
The hierarchical architecture of WSN allows for less communication, scalability, and routing by clustered networks. There are two types of clustered sensor networks: homogeneous and heterogeneous sensor networks. Homogenous sensor networks are identical in terms of battery energy and hardware complexity. However, in a heterogeneous sensor network two or more different kinds of nodes which are used with a various battery energy and functions [3] .
For WSN resource limitation and implementation in remote or hostile places make it easier for attackers to compromise the sensor nodes. WSNs are susceptible to different kinds of attacks from malicious nodes are within or outside of the communication range. Therefore, providing security for these sensor nodes is a serious issue for WSNs [4] [5] . A sybil attack poses a serious threat because it can be the gateway to other attacks especially the attacks on resource exhaustion, voting, etc. A sybil attack occurs when a malicious node, that is the sybil node, forges multiple fake identities by either creating new identities or stealing identities from legitimate nodes. By using these illegal identities the sybil node can achieve its goal of disproportionately influencing the network [6] .
With limitation energy, memory and other resources for each sensor node, a trust system against sybil attack is necessary. With the help of unique ID, position, and energy trust system, it is more difficult for the sybil node to attack the network. Furthermore, advantages can be gained by fully using the cluster head (CH).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section II summarizes the related work. Section III discusses the system's model and assumptions. Section IV further provides the analysis of the simulation with results. Finally, section V presents the conclusion and suggests some future directions.
II. RELATED WORK
The sybil attack was first described by Douceur as a kind of attack on peer-to-peer networks. To defeat this attack the redundancy approach was used to control a substantial fraction of a distributed system [7] . Karlof and Wagner pointed out a sybil attack could pose a threat in the routing of a WSN. They proposed a security mechanism based on a unique symmetric key for resisting this attack [8] . However, the base station required a node's identity for authentication to establish a session between two nodes in the net leading to an overload of communication especially when the WSN had a large number of nodes. Furthermore, due to the use of a common distribution key for the entire network, all the network became susceptible to attacks when one node was captured [9] .
There are different kinds of sybil attacks like data aggregation, distributed storage, voting, resource allocation and misbehavior detection.
A sybil node can create multiple identities. However, attacks like voting and aggregation can be detected by collecting information such as node's reputation from neighboring nodes and then checked by using threshold values. It helps in overcoming some weakness points. 978-1-5090-0019-7/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE when a node takes less communication time, a subset of neighboring information is selected when the node density size is high making it difficult to detect the sybil node. However, sometimes the range of communication makes the detection of the fake node impossible and this is the worst case [5] . While, in the study [10] , they used the time difference of arrival (TDOA) of the messages between the source node and beacon node to detect and locate sybil node. However, this method is considered a localization technique as it needs beacon nodes. Building a security system based on aggregated information about each sensor node is another scheme applied to predicate sybil attack as revealed in paper [11] . Another study suggests an authentication scheme in which each node's ID should be authenticated by its neighbors' ID [12] .
Besides gathering information, the localization algorithm is used for detecting sybil attack when two or more different identities share almost the same position. This mechanism makes use of parameters like Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI), time, and power level. A node is considered as a sybil node when it uses more time and consumes more power [5] . Furthermore, in [13] security mechanism based on RSSI is considered a lightweight method for detecting sybil attack in WSNs compared to other mechanisms like cryptography. However, this mechanism is unreliable because it varies with time.
In recent years, the use of trust mechanism is suggested as an important security system in WSNs. It is defined as "the authenticated entry and communication of a network participant or a third party". Typically, the trust system is evaluated directly based on the past behavior of the nodes or indirectly by combining with the reputation from other nodes. Other kinds of trust or power trust mechanisms concentrate on peer-to-peer computing [14] [15].
In [16] , the authors proposed a lightweight group-based trust management scheme (GTMS) for clustered WSNs based on direct observations or recommendations. This method uses less memory for each node. However, GTMS trust is considers only the experience of past interactions in message delivery. Furthermore, it uses a significant amount of power mechanism to improve the resource efficiency of clustered WSNs. This method relies on a broadcast-based strategy to collect feedback among cluster members (CMs). It requires a significant amount of power and resources to collect CMs' feedback. In [1] , a hierarchical trust management was proposed to resist selfish or malicious nodes in heterogeneous WSNs. Trust evaluation is based on the social trust (intimacy and honesty) and quality of service trust (energy and unselfishness). However, this method is complex and consumes a significant amount of power and resource because it maintains two trust levels: sensor node (SN) level trust and cluster head (CH) level trust. SN evaluates its neighbor nodes in the same cluster and sends feedback to the head, whereas CH evaluates its SNs and other CHs before sending feedback to the base station. In [17] a lightweight and dependable trust system (LDTS) was proposed for clustered WSNs. CHs The aforementioned trust-based routing schemes observed the packet forwarding behavior of a neighboring nodes and hence consumed energy and overhead communications. This system uses a centralized trust management mechanism, both at intra-group and intergroup levels. Furthermore, for trust aggregation, it adopts a selfadaptive weighted approach. In addition, it improves efficiency, save energy and overhead communication by canceling the feedback between the CMs or CHs. However, direct communication between the CH and sink to collect recommendations about other CHs demands higher energy.
As mentioned previously trust topic in WSN is still an open and challenging field especially for detecting sybil attack in WSNs using the energy of the SN as a threshold parameter. Energy consumption can be used to measure whether the SN is performing its intended function. when the node is compromised, then it consumes more energy to perform the attacks [1] .
In this work, a hierarchal trust system for WSN is proposed. The key design of this trust system is based on energy trust and focused on peer to peer computing. A reduction in overhead communication, energy, and other resources is done by cancelling feedback and recommendations between SNs or between CHs levels. Furthermore, this mechanism uses a unique identity for each SN, localization, and data aggregation to encounter and detect sybil attack in a WSN.
III. ENERGY TRUST SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTION

A. Network Architecture and Assumptions
The system architecture for this study is based on a threelevel hierarchical WSN topology, including the following three kinds of nodes. SNs that are organized as groups or clusters, CH nodes that forward the data obtained from SNs to the base station in the upper layer, and base station (BS) node. BS and CHs are trustful and are not compromised by any attack. In addition, they have more power and resources than SNs. The election of CH is not in the scope of this study but the CHs could be chosen based on an election protocol such as HEED [18] .
B. Sybil Detection Approach
The proposed energy trust system worked in clustered WSNs based on a light weight scheme where a centralized management scheme was employed. Each SN sends its reading to the CH. Then the CH evaluates other SNs in its cluster based on the trust values. Furthermore, the CH maintains a matrix which includes the (ID, Position, E) of each node under its observation. Then, it sends the data to the BS. Fig. 1 depicts the network architecture in which the energy trust system is implemented. The system can be described as follows: C. Sensor Node Level: Each SN sends its reading to its CH accompanied with its identity < ID, Position, E t >. Each node has a unique ID and position. E t is continuously updated with every message that it sent to upper layer. E t is calculated as in equation (1):
Where E state : energy consumed in every state of sensor node. E T , E R , E S, E switching : energy consumed in transmitting, receiving, sleep, switching state respectively. E residual: residual energy available in the sensor node D. Cluster Head Level: Whenever a message arrives at the CH, multilevel detection is performed to detect sybil attack through the following steps:
• Checking: The monitoring node (CH) checks the sensor's ID and Position of the received message. When the node is related to its cluster, the next step of detection, which is trust calculation, will be initiated. The first step is used to detect a sybil attack with a forged identity and position but we add the next step (trust calculation) in case that the attacker node succeed in impersonating ID and Position of legal node which is difficult and considered as a worst case of sybil attack.
• Trust Calculation: The monitoring node checks E t as in equation (3). When (E = E t + ), then the number of successful (S) number is increased; otherwise, the unsuccessful (U) number is increased.
Where E: is the energy value saved in the matrix of the CH. E t : is the energy value in the message sent to the CH.
: is rate of energy variation.
Trust is calculated as equation (4) which is used in [17] . (4) where the timing window t was used in [16] and [17] based on successful and unsuccessful interactions. In this study, it is used to count the successful and unsuccessful interactions of nodes based on the result of equation (3). Hence, as time progresses, the window omits the oldest experiences but adds of the newer ones. The length of the timing window can be made shorter or longer based on network analysis of the scenarios. is the nearest integer function. The CH evaluates the trust value of the SN as an unsigned integer in the range of [0, 10] , where 10 indicates the complete trust efficient in terms of memory [17] . Successful and unsuccessful amounts were decided based on the result of equation (3) as in equation (5). (5) IV. SIMULATION BASED ANALYSIS AND EVALUATON
I.
Simulated Environment: To study the performance of the system, OMNeT++ was used.19 sensor nodes are deployed. The nodes were static and were organized to make all the clusters in equal size of nine nodes. The network comprised of one BS. Table (I) shows the parameters used in the simulation of the system. 
II. Simulated Environment:
The probability of detecting a sybil attack is illustrated when there are two clusters each with 9 SNs and varying number of sybils from (4 to 16) with the same ID and position in the clustered WSN. Then, applying the energy trust system to detect such attacks. Figures 2 and 3 show the performance of the proposed system in this study in terms of true and false positive. True positive is the accurate detection of a sybil attack, whereas, false positive is the wrong detection of such an attack. A normalized value was also used. The results show that the sybil detection for the system is more than 87% with significantly less number of false positive. Cancelling the feedback and recommendation between SNs and CHs in all levels of the system saves energy and reduces the overhead communications.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
A sybil attack happens when a malicious node illegitimately claims to have false identities of existing nodes with the aim of disrupting the network's functions such as voting and data aggregation. Considering the nature of a sybil attack, we proposed a hierarchical trust detection system for detecting sybil attack in WSNs. The trust energy system consists of three levels of checking the ID, position, and trust evaluation based on the energy of the sensor nodes. The results indicate that this system is effective in detecting sybil attack in WSNs. Furthermore, the varying numbers of SNs deployed under the control of a monitoring node is applicable.
Currently, we are working on two parameters namely energy and memory consumption. For future work, further research can be done by investigating the feasibility of applying this system on dynamic networks such as mobile WSNs and MANETs. Moreover, evaluating the validity of this proposed system for detecting other kinds of attacks can be conducted. 
